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Abstract 
In the United States, women often show less interest in politics, and under some conditions, 
perform worse than men on political knowledge tests. In an age where education levels have reached 
parity, we suggest one of the explanations for gender differences in political engagement might be 
due to selection of occupation. Past research has shown women and men segregate into different 
occupations due to early gender socialization, differences in interest, and structural barriers. It is 
possible that due to these segregation effects, women in traditional female occupations (e.g. 
education, health care, service work) may have less access to personal internet use and news sources 
during their work days. Using the 2014 General Social Survey, we create a new occupational 
typology based on access to the internet to explore whether individuals in certain sectors differ in 
their political engagement and how these occupations are also divided by gender, race and class. 
Then we apply the technology use measure to the 2016 American National Election Study and find 
that technology access on the job does not seem to be related to political knowledge, once we 
account for education, which offers some insight into the mechanisms by which individuals gain this 
knowledge. In addition, the interaction between total media consumption and tech use suggests that 
the gap in political knowledge between men and women is stubbornly persistent.  
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Full-time working Americans spend a lot of time at their place of employment. For many 
people, work offers opportunities for socialization. There is speculation and some measure of the 
veritable water cooler by which workers chat, learn, and network with their peers, bosses, and 
subordinates. In some instances, workplace discussions are politically oriented and offer workers a 
chance to hear a diverse range of political perspectives (Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Yet, for most social 
science research, the workplace and associated occupation serve as a code, a socio-economic 
measure, or a secondary/third/fourth identity to what we assume happens in other parts of life. By 
not fully exploring how people engage with others at work, we are potentially missing a major 
contributor of people’s political behaviors. We generally understand how workplace socialization 
influences political discussions and exposure to different views. Yet, we know much less about how 
online social networking and reading political content at work influence political behavior variables 
like political knowledge. Thus, in this paper we assess how differential access to technology at work, 
based on gender segregation into particular careers, influences political knowledge.   
People’s workplaces are a place to build careers by networking with coworkers, bosses, and 
subordinates. Yet for some Americans, the workplace also serves as an extension of their personal 
lives. They are friends with co-workers (Sias & Cahill, 1998) and socialize with them both in and out 
of the workplace (Tse, Dasborough, & Ashkanasy, 2008). Additionally, they can interact with friends 
outside of the workplace by taking personal phone calls, checking email, browsing Facebook or 
Instagram, and catching up on the latest news from time to time or at least over the lunch hour. 
However, for others, the time at work may feel like a cave away from the outside world – one from 
which people emerge to find an event of great significance has taken place -- a friend had a baby, or 
a president has made another social media declaration. Access to technology at work, whether via 
email, perusing news websites, or through social media, serves as one way to acquire political 
information while on the job. Additionally, some research suggests that many workers are using 
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social media in particular to access political information at much higher rates than even a few years 
ago. For instance, since the 2016 presidential election, workers have reported spending an average of 
two hours per day reading social media posts at work and about 20% say they read 20 or more 
political social media posts at work every day (McGregor, 2017).  
As social scientists, we rarely account for when and where these forms of digital 
communication occur. This leads us to ask are there differences between those that remain 
connected at work, at home, and at play versus those that have limited or no access to the internet 
for up to eight hours a day? We also know that occupations are segregated by demographic 
characteristics – thus, could these differences help explain why we find persistent gaps that exist in 
political knowledge across gender?  
Certainly, occupational prestige and “choice” could represent a proxy for class status, 
income, education, and certain types of identity. But what if the very nature of particular jobs 
precludes workers from engaging in outside matters during working hours? Individuals may seek 
careers in education, social work, or health care as a way to “make a difference,” yet these very same 
sectors may disallow personal political engagement on the job. School teachers often joke about 
scheduling in bathroom breaks, and there are often strict rules about using computers for personal 
purposes. Add to this effect that women tend to occupy these roles, and the moment they leave 
work, they start their “second shift” as wives and mothers, and who has time to check Twitter? Read 
CNN? Follow the links someone posted to Facebook? In the words of a teacher with small children, 
“maybe women just don’t have the time or energy to worry about politics.” 
So, what’s going on with occupation? Social scientists and government offices measure it, 
extensively. It’s coded pedantically, but we do not know how these differences in occupations 
influence political engagement at the workplace. We attempt to address this gap in political 
information access by first using the 2014 General Social Survey to define the extent to which 
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occupational groups have access to the internet or technology at work and how this breaks down by 
gender. We then apply the technology use measure to the 2016 American National Election Study to 
test whether access at work is associated with varying levels of political knowledge.   
Occupational Selection and Segregation 
Self-selection into certain occupations and subsequent gender segregation into particular 
careers likely begins early in life for men and women. From an early age, boys and girls learn how to 
behave according to their ascribed gender roles, usually because those around them tend to classify 
sex before engaging with them (Ridgeway, 2009). Similarly, sex segregation can emerge quite early in 
the path to many careers (Correll, 2001). While it may appear that men and women are making their 
own choices when it comes to occupation, they may be involuntarily led into specific careers because 
of  their socialization as children (Ridgeway, 2009). Adolescents develop interests that influence the 
classes taken in high school, which in turn may influence whether and what is pursued in higher 
education, eventually leading to occupation choice. Sex differences persistently emerge in the 
reasoning for why women and men choose their specific occupations (Su, Round, & Armstrong, 
2009). For example, women often show interests in social and artistic activities, and men may be 
drawn to or encouraged to pursue scientific, technical, and mechanical activities (Su et al., 2009). 
Since women tend to enjoy working with people more than things (Su et al., 2009), they may pursue 
majors/fields of  study that match those interests (Correll, 2001).  
In the past several decades, however, women have started transitioning into certain male-
dominated occupations. This shift is not necessarily related to a change in female curiosities as 
evidence still shows that men and women continue to have different educational and occupational 
interests (Su et al., 2009), but instead from women attempting to bypass the “glass ceiling” set in 
female-dominated industries. In order for women to continue up the ladder of  mobility, many of  
them have to either make a career change or go back to school. A nurse cannot be promoted to a 
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doctor, an elementary school teacher cannot work her way up to superintendent, and a social worker 
cannot become a supervisor or counselor without more education. England (2010) suggests if  it 
weren’t for the “glass ceiling” in traditional female occupations, women would stay in their line of  
work instead of  changing to a male-dominated field. This occupational change more often than not 
forces women to move backwards on the ladder of  success, starting again in a new field.  
Currently, desegregation has stalled in the workforce. Women are becoming lawyers, doctors, 
and accountants, but remain underrepresented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM). Even when women earn STEM degrees, they do not enter traditional STEM jobs after 
graduation. For instance, in 2014, 74 percent of  STEM graduates did not work in STEM 
occupations, and these individuals tended to be women, and men continue to be overrepresented in 
engineering and computer science (Census Bureau, 2014). Since STEM occupations require specific 
degrees, researchers suggest this segregation occurs early on in educational careers (Correll, 2001). 
For example, by high school, boys are more likely than girls to show an interest and be enrolled in 
advanced math and science classes (Correll, 2001). These educational paths may lead boys into 
occupations with all-day access to technology, even for personal use, and girls into helping 
professions with less time for online engagement. Though the focus of  our current study is how this 
occupational segregation may result in technology access gaps, we also want to push social scientists 
to think more about how gendered occupations influence political engagement (e.g. the large 
teachers strikes occurring across the United States, generally led by women).  
Technology at Work 
When women started to enter the workforce, they transitioned into and subsequently 
dominated the service industry and helping-related jobs. With traditional hours and the availability of 
part-time or full-time employment, women felt the service industry offered them the balance of 
work and home life they desired (Waldman & McEddy, 1974). As mentioned previously, women are 
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still clustered in the traditional female “service” occupations where they serve as nurses, teachers, 
social workers, and physical therapists (Hegewisch et al., 2010). Given the fact that these professions 
deal with people directly, women may be more likely to spend most of their workday engaging in 
face-to-face conversations and less of their time utilizing technological devices. 
We suspect that these service or people-oriented positions come with less access to personal 
internet use/political news on the job. A useful starting point for understanding digital access by 
occupation entails narrowing down which professions use the most technology in day-to-day tasks 
and to what extent professions allow for the recreational use of  the internet and/or email while on 
the job. A Pew Research report (2014) examined which occupations rely the most on technology 
usage throughout the day. Online users were separated into office-based and non-office-based work, 
which included service work, and they found that internet and email were more important to certain 
workforce sectors than others. People who worked in an office were three times as likely to choose 
usage of  email (78% versus 25%) and two times more likely to choose internet (68% versus 25%) as 
being very important to their job (Pew Research 2014). 
Importantly, even if  women are able to achieve a high-status job with access to technology, 
women often feel pressure to show stronger work commitment in their labor; therefore, they tend to 
engage less in workplace leisure activities, such as non-work-related computer use. In a study of 
social norms and employee attitudes, Moody and Siponen (2013) find that employees are more 
influenced by the benefits of recreational internet use at work than by the penalties, and the more 
their peers engage in this behavior, the more likely they follow. This same logic can be applied to 
how people think about and discuss politics and whether or not they engage in this behavior in the 
workplace. Connecting these behaviors to gender and status, Garrett and Danziger (2008) 
demonstrate that those in higher career positions use the internet at work more often than those in 
lower status positions. Since men use the internet for more leisure activities (Garrett & Danziger, 
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2008) and are often found to be in higher ranking positions, this would explain why males, on 
average, report engaging in more counterproductive computer use at work than women (Everton, 
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005).   
Women may use the internet just as much as men, but they may not be using it for the same 
things. Women use the internet more for communication, and men more for searching (Jackson, 
Ervin, Gardner & Schmitt, 2001). Women were the early adopters of  social media, and there still 
continues to be a gender gap in social media use (Pew Research Center, 2018). Women tend to use 
their leisure time going through social media networks and connecting on sites such as Facebook, 
Instagram, and Pinterest while men search sites such as Twitter and Reddit. Women tend to use 
social media for social connections and personal interest rather than for news so even though they 
use social media at higher rates than men, they are being exposed to different information (Pew 
Research Center, 2018). Due to the fact that men and women already use the internet differently 
from each other, and women generally tend to consume less news than men (Poindexter, Meraz, & 
Weiss, 2008), it is difficult to know if  given the opportunity to engage in “cyberslacking” at work, 
women will use it to seek out political content. Instead, women may use their time at work to either 
perform their job duties or communicate with others when they can spare a moment. 
Political Knowledge and Access to Information  
 Increased access to technology and information in the workplace brings about opportunities 
for people to frequently access the internet and social media platforms on their phones and 
computers. We expect that access to technology and information will not be equally distributed 
along gender lines due to differences in job requirements and expectations. For individuals who have 
more time during their work day to access information, we expect that increased opportunities for 
accessing political information will subsequently relate to higher levels of political knowledge. 
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Political knowledge is often described as a cornerstone construct of political science 
(Mondak, 2001) and the “currency of democratic citizenship” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 8). 
The typical measures of political knowledge focus on factual knowledge related to key political 
actors, the basics of public policy issues, and the rules of politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Lupia, 2016). Thus, typical survey batteries measuring political knowledge ask questions like who the 
chief justice of the Supreme Court is, who are the primary beneficiaries of Medicaid programs, and 
the votes required to override a veto.i 
 The relationship between online information access and political knowledge remains up for 
debate. Increased access to technology, information, and political news has not necessarily brought 
about a widespread increase in the American public’s political knowledge (Prior 2007). For example, 
some scholars argue that social media use does not lead to increased political knowledge (Richey & 
Zhu, 2015; Shehata, Hopmann, Nord, & Hoijer, 2015). Lower barriers for accessing information 
does not necessarily equate to increased attention to political information (Dunaway, Searles, Sui, & 
Paul, 2018). Additionally, unlike actively seeking political information, incidental exposure to 
political information via social media may not lead to increased political knowledge (Gil de Zúñiga, 
Weeks, & Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017). Yet, others demonstrate that a reliance on the internet and social 
media has the capacity to increase specific types of knowledge, such as knowledge about presidential 
debates (Gottfried, Hardy, Holbert, Winneg, & Jamison, 2017). Generally, the effects of the 
relationship between internet use and political knowledge are dependent on individual characteristics 
like age and education (Yoo and Gil de Zúñiga, 2014), media behaviors like clicking on and sharing 
information (Beam, Hutchens, & Hmielowski, 2016), and device type (Dunaway, Searles, Sui, & 
Paul, 2018). How useful online access is for political knowledge also varies based on the quality of 
information and ability of users to discern quality sources (Urban & Schweiger, 2014). Access to 
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technology in the workplace may be an additional factor that influences political knowledge, but this 
relationship has so far remained underexplored.    
Gender Gaps in Political Knowledge 
As women have advanced in education, higher status occupations, and thereby higher levels 
of socioeconomic status, it remains puzzling why gender gaps in political knowledge continue to 
persist. These gaps in knowledge remain well-documented (Dow 2011; Sabonmatus 2003; Verba, 
Burns, & Schlozman 1997) with men generally scoring better on the typical battery (Delli Carpini & 
Keeter 1996) of political knowledge survey items. Yet, scholars have creatively and thoughtfully 
explored this phenomenon, by suggesting that factors like differential uncertainty, construction of 
response options for knowledge questions, and propensity to guess on political knowledge survey 
questions result in men appearing to have higher levels of political knowledge compared to women 
(Lizotte & Sidman, 2009; Mondak & Anderson, 2004).ii Others focus on exploring knowledge 
beyond the typical knowledge battery by examining differences in knowledge domains (Eveland & 
Hively, 2009) and differences in knowledge levels based on knowledge types (i.e. gender relevant 
political knowledge such as women’s representation in Congress) (Dolan, 2011). Additionally, 
scholars have examined how people perceive political knowledge of people in their social networks 
and find differences in perceived expertise with women perceived to be less knowledgeable than 
men (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Mendez & Osborn, 2010). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that although gender gaps persist, some of these gaps are due to methodological approach, like 
question format and available response options, but also different socialization processes, such as 
perceptions of expertise and aversion to risk, that influence men and women.  
For the purposes of our study, we are most interested in how information access influences 
political knowledge. For example, Jerit and Barabas (2017) find that once exposed to political 
information, women gain ground, and the gap diminishes. We are suggesting that occupation can 
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operate as an impediment to information flows, particularly when it comes to digital access. Thus, 
increased access to technology at work could lead to higher levels of political knowledge while less 
access and increased digital segregation could result in decreased levels of political knowledge.  
Data and Method 
To test our expectations regarding access to technology at work in political knowledge, we 
turn to two nationally represented surveys – the General Social Survey (GSS) and American 
National Election Study (ANES).iii These surveys are the largest, publicly available datasets to 
contain the same U.S. Census Occupational codes, a technology use variable, and political measures. 
As the most widely used datasets in the social sciences, we also wished to demonstrate how other 
scholars could leverage occupation in other questions of interest. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study of its kind to develop an occupational tech use measure in one dataset to be used to generate a 
comparable variable in another dataset that does not have a technology measure. In the 2014 wave 
of the GSS, the instrument included the following question: “During a typical week, about what 
percentage of your total time at work would you normally spend using different types of electronic 
technologies (such as computers, tablets, smart phones, cash registers, scanners, GPS devices, 
robotic devices, and so on)?” (usetech). Respondents were able to respond with a range of values 
from zero to one hundred percent. This question provides a unique insight into how the use of 
technology is permeating the workplace, though it does not distinguish between personal and work-
related use. In total, the 2014 GSS had 2,538 respondents, however, only about half the sample had 
the opportunity to answer the question about the usage of technology (48.4%). Of those who 
provided a response, the mean percentage falls just about the midpoint, with the average subject 
indicating that they use technology 52.4% of the time. There are slight deviations based on gender, 
however. While the mean usetech score for men was 48.6%, women were slightly more inclined to 
use technology at 56.1% (p < .05).  
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Insert Figure 1 About Here 
For our purposes, we are interested in how this usetech score is distributed across different 
occupational classes. The U.S. Census Bureau has created an extremely detailed typology whereby 
respondents describe the responsibilities of their job and are sorted into an industry code which 
consists of about three hundred options (Census Bureau, 2017). The authors of the General Social 
Survey replicate this exact Census code classification. Because the sample size of the GSS is 
magnitudes of order smaller than the data collected by the Census Bureau, it is necessary to 
aggregate these industry codes into larger occupational classes, a technique that has been used by 
other research in the field of workplace behavior (Garrett and Danzinger 2008). Using these 10 
occupational classes, Garrett and Danziger (2008) created a dichotomous variable of high-status 
occupations (management, business, financial, or professional) with all other job classes forming the 
reference category. The broader literature indicates those in higher status occupations have more 
access to the internet.  
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
Figure 2 visualizes the mean of usetech for each of the 10 occupational classes that are 
available in the General Social Survey, with all missing values removed. Notice that the two 
occupations in which people use the most technology (technology, engineering, and science along 
with management) also were classified as high technology use by previous scholarship. For the other 
two job classifications previously cited as heavy tech use -- health and technology and education, 
legal and media -- the GSS usetech mean is in the middle of the range. In addition, both office and 
administrative support, along with sales occupations, use technology approximately 2/3 of the time. 
This may be reflective of the rapid increase in the use of technology in certain occupations, since 
previous scholarship was based on data collected over a decade ago. The other major takeaway from 
these results is that there is not a clear means to create a dichotomous variable for high tech usage 
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and low-tech usage occupational classes. Instead, a more statistically precise approach to 
understanding technology usage by occupation would be to use the mean scores for each 
occupational class as a continuous variable. This has the advantage of maintaining the real distance 
between job classes.  
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
Is usetech unevenly distributed in occupational classes by gender? Figure 3 displays the 
differences between men and women in each of the 10 Census job classifications, as well as 95% 
confidence intervals for each estimate indicated by capped vertical lines. Speaking generally, women 
use technology more than their male counterparts when working in the same occupational field. The 
notable exception to that is education, legal, and media fields, where men use more technology 
(statistically significant). This is likely the case as more female respondents are in teaching 
professions, which had a lower level of usetech, while men made up a greater proportion of the legal 
field. There are some fields where female technology usage far outstrips that of males. For instance, 
in office and administrative support, women use technology approximately 25% more than men. A 
similar gap exists between men and women in the military. However, across all 10 occupational 
classifications, the difference between the genders is not statistically significant in most cases. Of the 
three with statistically different means, men only use technology more in one occupational area 
(education, legal, and media) while women utilize technology more in management and office and 
administrative support.  
While the GSS affords researchers this invaluable insight into the frequency of technology in 
the workplace, it does not provide the necessary questions for scholars to try and link this usetech 
variable with important political outcomes, most notably an increase in political knowledge. In 
addition, by transferring the usetech/occupational classifications to another dataset, we are avoiding 
generating hypotheses and testing them in the same data. Fortunately, the American National 
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Election Study contains both the Census occupational codes and five political knowledge questions, 
which have been used in numerous other studies (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Mondak, 2001). To 
link these two surveys together, we generated a new variable in the ANES dataset that transferred 
the mean usetech GSS score for each of the 10 occupational groups into which ANES participants 
fell. 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
Before moving to more sophisticated analyses, it is valuable to understand how political 
knowledge is distributed across both genders without any controls. Figure 4 indicates the 
distribution of political knowledge for both men and women. Each group was asked five questions 
ranging from easy: “Who is the current vice president of the United States?” to difficult: “Who is the 
current chief justice of the United States Supreme Court?”iv Importantly because of previous 
findings on men being more likely than women to “guess,” the answers were multiple choice, and a 
“don’t know” option was not presented to respondents. Approximately 8.6% of the female 
respondents were unable to correctly answer a single question, compared to about 5.1% of men. At 
the top end of the range, 32.8% of men were able to answer at least 4 questions correct, while 25.7% 
of women were able to do the same. The mean number of correct answers for men was 3.16, and 
for women, 2.74 (p < .05). These results indicate that women have lower levels of political 
knowledge, but is the use of technology a way to overcome that deficit in some scenarios?  
Insert Figure 5 About Here 
 
Figure 5 displays a simple linear relationship between the usage of technology on the x-axis and the 
number of knowledge questions answered correctly on the y-axis. Note that for both men and 
women, the relationship is positive and significant (coefficient for men = .197, women = .171, p < 
.00) in that the more an individual uses technology at their job, the more likely they are to evince 
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higher levels of political knowledge. Consider however, that the y-intercept for males in the sample 
is nearly 10% higher, which is indicative of the knowledge literature previously described. While the 
relationship between these two variables is slightly more positive for males, the gain in knowledge 
between the two genders is relatively small (just .03 on a scale from 0-5).    
In order to further isolate the relationship between using technology and political 
knowledge, an OLS regression was specified with political knowledge as the dependent variable. The 
previously used item usetech was included as well as a question that asks how many days a week an 
individual watches, reads, or listens to news besides sports. In addition, the ANES asks individuals, 
“How often do you pay attention to what’s going on in government and politics?” They were then 
given five response options ranging from “Never” to “Always” with “About half of the time” as the 
middle option.  In addition, a number of controls were added including: highest level of education 
completed, a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent has children under the age of 18 
at home, and income (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Hillygus, 2005; McLeod & Perse, 1994; 
Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970). All variables were scaled from zero to one to aid in 
interpretation. Because of the standardization technique, each coefficient is showing the full effect 
of each variable (for instance the estimate for education is going from lacking a high school diploma 
to having a graduate degree). The data was divided into a male-only sample and a female-only 
sample as means to determine if these variables work in different ways for men and men. The results 
of the regression are displayed in a coefficient plot in Figure 6. The interpretation of the plot is 
straightforward: if one of the colored horizontal lines intersects with the vertical solid line on 0, then 
the variable is not statistically significant. However, if there is no intersection, and it is to the right of 
the solid line on zero, that indicates greater political knowledge. If it’s to the left of the solid line, it 
means less political knowledge. 
Insert Figure 6 About Here 
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The first finding is the most striking: these variables, by and large, do not work in different 
ways for men than they do for women. One important exception to this is news consumption, 
where the relationship is statistically significant and positive for men but is not statistically significant 
for women. This regression result indicates that the more days a week that men consume news, the 
more likely they are to gain political knowledge, while the same is not true for women. Of the other 
variables included, only one (having children) drives down political knowledge, but the effect 
reaches statistical significance only for women. This comports with previous work on the so-called 
“second shift” problem that has appeared in other research (Hochschild 1989; Blair-Loy et al. 2015). 
Three of the other variables (political interest, education, and income) are all positively related to 
political knowledge. Unsurprisingly, political interest and education are the two factors that are the 
strongest drivers of political knowledge (Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, & Rainey, 2014; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996; Price & Zaller, 1993). Consider the fact that moving from the lowest level of 
education to the highest moves an individual up 2.3-2.4 questions on the political knowledge scale, 
all else being held equal. Income has a positive effect as well, but it is much smaller.v 
The variable of interest for this study, the amount of technology used in the workplace, is 
not a significant predictor. While the coefficient is positive, the standard errors leave open the 
possibility that the effect could potentially be negative.vi It is worth pondering why this is the case. 
Obviously, there is a great deal of correlation between many of the variables. For instance, education 
and the usage of technology at work are correlated at .36, which provides support for the theory that 
greater levels of education lead individuals into white collar careers that typically involved significant 
usage of technology (a visualization of these correlations is available in the appendix). When a 
regression model is specified that omits the control for education, the use of technology becomes 
statistically significant and predicts more political knowledge (shown in the appendix). Therefore, it 
seems as if the impact of technology usage is strongly related to the level of education of individuals.  
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Undoubtedly, this relationship can be impacted by a number of factors, with variables such 
as political interest playing a role in how much an individual cares to learn about politics. As 
previously mentioned, the ANES asks respondents about their political interest. To create a 
dichotomous variable of political interest, individuals who responded to this question with the two 
lowest options were classified as “Low Interest,” while those who responded with one of the top 
three choices were put into the “High Interest” category. A marginal effects model was specified for 
both men and women that interacted the amount of technology they used at their jobs with how 
interested they were in day-to-day politics, with controls for income, having children, education, and 
news consumption included. The results of this model are displayed in Figure 7.  
Insert Figure 7 About Here 
When looking at just those with low interest in following politics, there is an upward slope in 
the line moving from left to right, however the gain in political knowledge is much larger for men 
than for women. For men with low political interest, they gain nearly .8 of a question correctly as 
they use more technology at work, but for the same group of women, the gain is approximately half 
of one question. For those of high interest, both genders see substantively large gains in political 
knowledge moving from the low part of the usetech scale to the higher end. However, even at the 
far right end of the scale, there is a large gap between how much political knowledge men possess 
(3.2 questions correct) versus women (2.85 questions correct). Notice that at all levels of usetech, 
men have higher levels of political knowledge than women, and the gap does not narrow moving 
across the x-axis. The real story is, as previously mentioned, the y-intercept. Men consistently have a 
higher baseline of political knowledge than women, and the usage of technology does not narrow 
this gap.  
There is much to consider from these results. There is not a negative relationship between 
using technology at work and political knowledge; in fact, in all four cases studied here, the more 
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technology that one uses, the more political knowledge is gained. The relative amount of political 
knowledge that is gained for each of the four groups is consistent as well. However, another way to 
look at these results is: technology usage is not narrowing the gap for those of low interest. For 
those who are highly politically interested, the “rich” are getting “richer” at the same rate. For both 
men and women, there is a gain in knowledge, however that gain in knowledge is slightly greater for 
men than women. These results provide evidence that technology usage increases political 
knowledge for both genders, across levels of interest.  
Insert Figure 8 About Here 
One other possibility is worth exploring: consumption of news. As previously described, the 
ANES asks respondents, “During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to 
news on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the internet, not including sports?” Response options 
range from none to seven days a week. The sample was broken into those with low consumption 
(four days a week or less) and those with high consumption (five to seven days a week), and this was 
interacted with the usetech variable. Figure 8 is a margins plot of this interaction. Here the results 
are much different than the interaction between political interest and usetech. While there is clearly a 
positive relationship between usetech and political knowledge when broken down by political 
interest, news consumption generates no statistically significant relationship for either men or 
women, regardless of if they indicated high or low media consumption. The effects here are 
especially modest, with low consumption men and women gaining less than a quarter of a question 
moving across the x-axis. It is notable that for the female sample, there is not a statistically 
significant difference in gaining political knowledge between those who consume a great deal of 
news media and those who consume much less of it. Again, however, the y-intercepts are instructive 
here. Men consistently start at a higher baseline of political knowledge, and news media 
consumption is not narrowing this gap as one uses more technology at work.  
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Discussion 
Social scientists continue to uncover the nuanced ways in which men and women differ in 
their political knowledge and interest. We wish to add to that discussion by examining access to 
technology in a societal area often segregated by gender – the workplace. From our data, it appears 
technology access does not contribute to the gender gap in political engagement; rather, other 
psychological and social factors may lead women to use work technology for other purposes 
(Jackson, Ervin, Gardner & Schmitt, 2001; Poindexter, Meraz, & Weiss, 2008). Avoiding political 
content online, then, may have more to do with the inherent conflict in politics, and women tending 
to be higher than men on conflict avoidance (Brooks, 2010; Ulbig and Funk, 1999;  Djupe, McClurg 
and Sokhey, 2016; Wolak and McDevitt, 2011). It is also possible women are accessing political 
information that does not conform to the knowledge battery included in the ANES but is policy or 
domain specific (Eveland & Hively, 2009). Future research should explore how the different ways of 
knowing politics is distributed across access to technology at work. For example, social workers, 
health workers and teachers are likely very knowledgeable about policies across these areas and may 
use their technological access to read stories on these matters but may be less interested in naming 
people in positions of power.  
In general, there is very little work in social science about the role of political information 
access in the workplace, particularly via technological resources. Of the workplace studies that have 
been conducted, most focus on in-person social networks at work that lead to political discussions 
or the role of information exposure at work on influencing political attitudes. For example, 
Banaszak and Leighley (1991) found that women’s employment contexts shaped their attitudes 
towards women’s movements. Working in male-dominated fields led to increases in support by 
women for women’s movements (Banaszak & Leighley, 1991).  
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Previous research has uncovered gender differences in political discussion. Men are more 
likely than women to discuss politics (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995), express opinions (Atkeson & 
Rapoport, 2003), and try to influence others (Rapoport, 1981; Hansen, 1997). Men and women’s 
discussion networks also look different from one another as men overwhelmingly discuss politics 
with other men (Djupe, McClurg, and Sokhey, 2016). Additionally, women are judged by others in 
their social networks to be less competent and politically knowledgeable (Huckfeldt & Sprague 
1995). These findings reflect information exposure via political discussions but do not discuss the 
role of the workplace for these discussions. These gendered patterns in political discussion have the 
potential to reinforce other gendered gaps in the workplace, particularly in regard to political 
information exposure through access to technology.  
Other studies that assess how the workplace influences political behavior focus on the role 
of workplace life on political participation. For example, Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1999) find 
that gender gaps in political participation can be explained by gender differences in workplace 
experiences while others find that career roles (Elden, 1981) and job autonomy (Jian & Jeffres, 2008) 
can influence levels of political efficacy and participation outside of the workplace. Yet, they do not 
demonstrate how workplace roles or job autonomy influence political knowledge.  
Although there have been studies of the workplace environment and political behavior, 
social science research has generally focused on political behavior generally or in citizens’ personal 
lives. Yet, many people spend a substantial portion of their time each week in the workplace. Recent 
surveys (McGregor, 2017) indicates widespread increases in accessing political information at work. 
But these increases will only exist for people who have the opportunity to use technology for non-
work purposes like checking personal emails, perusing news websites, and using social media. 
Increased attention to these differences could help us further understand the gendered differences 
we repeatedly find for political behaviors like political knowledge.   
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 Though class, geography, and aptitudes influence occupation selection, men and women 
tend to choose different career paths. Through this study, we investigate if women’s selection of 
jobs in the helping profession or with high person-to-person interaction leads to less access to 
technology, indicating reduced time for consuming online content. This study serves as an 
exploration of digital segregation using the nationally representative data that are currently available. 
We were limited by the availability of data that contains occupational codes, political knowledge, 
political engagement, and technology usage on the job. To further understand how workplace 
segregation, often based on gender, influences political engagement, social scientists should consider 
incorporating measures of workplace characteristics into studies of political behavior, rather than 
focusing just on what happens outside of the workday. Questions of technological access and 
content of information will be important going forward as people are increasingly spending time at 
work accessing political information. These increases could further the gap between the knowledge 
rich and the knowledge poor due to accessibility.   
 In the end, we find some indications that generally tech use on the job does not seem to be 
related to political knowledge, other than serving as a proxy of sorts for education. This could help 
scholars interested in the education connection to think through the mechanisms by which 
individuals are gaining political knowledge. In addition, the interaction between total media 
consumption and tech use suggests that when women have an interest in following the news and 
have access at work, they can outperform men and women who are low media consumers with 
equal tech use. This may provide more insight into the “higher bar” thesis that suggests women tend 
to require high levels of knowledge before undertaking political activities (Ondercin & Jones-White, 
2011). Other scholars have noted that typical predictors of knowledge like education vary based on 
the amount of information in the information environment and mass media (Jerit, Barabas, & 
Bolsen, 2006). Additionally, the persistent political knowledge gender gap can be reduced with 
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exposure to news and political information (Jerit & Barabas, 2017). The findings from our study 
serve as a test case for the information environment theory where access to technology works as a 
measure of exposure to the information environment. Our study also supplements other research 
that focuses on how career women gain the social capital necessary for civic skill development and 
political engagement (Burns, Schlozman, & Verba 2001). Beyond additional samples with improved 
measures, future research should also address how to think about further connections between other 
demographic characteristics like race and class with occupations and personal access to political 
content in the workplace. Ultimately, if some people are using the workplace as a space for accessing 
political news and information for substantial periods of time, while others do not have these same 
opportunities for access, then we may find further gaps in political knowledge based on the 
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Regression Model in Figure 7 
 Dependent variable: 
 Predicting Political Knowledge 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) 
Tech Usage 0.298 0.271 
 (0.204) (0.173) 
Political Interest 1.653* 1.060* 
 (0.266) (0.240) 
Education 2.286* 2.425* 
 (0.387) (0.365) 
Have Kids -0.426* -0.180 
 (0.101) (0.095) 
Income 0.593* 0.824* 
 (0.191) (0.183) 
News Consumption 0.059 0.671* 
 (0.195) (0.194) 
Constant -0.685* -0.891* 
 (0.291) (0.257) 
Observations 1,008 1,186 
R2 0.169 0.166 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.162 
Residual Std. Error 1.558 (df = 1001) 1.582 (df = 1179) 












i Debate exists regarding the usefulness of typical political knowledge batteries, where the questions 
are often static in nature and relate to national-level politics (Barabas et al., 2014; Kuklinski & Quirk, 
2001; Lupia, 2016). Measures of political knowledge in this study come from the General Social 
Survey and American National Election Studies, which tend to rely on the more typical measures of 
political knowledge.  
ii Our study relies on the political knowledge measures from the 2016 American National Election 
Study. These questions did not include "don’t know” as an available response option.  
iii The 2014 GSS sample had 2,538 total respondents, with 45% indicating that they were male 
compared to 55% female. The ANES had a total of 4,271 respondents, the gender breakdown was 
46.5% male, 52.3% female, and 1.2% who did not answer.  
iv For each response, only those who responded correctly were coded as one, while those who did 
not give the correct response were coded as zero. For each of the five questions, there was a portion 
of the sample were not asked to complete the post-election interview or the ANES coded them as 
“no post data.” For each of the five questions this was 14.5% of the total sample. The differences in 
this omitted cases was less than 1% between men and women and therefore should not bias the 
sample in any meaningful way.  
v A full regression table is available in the Appendix 
vi The effect size of usetech on political knowledge was .271 with 95% CI = [.224, .311] for the male 
sample. For the female sample the effect size of usetech was .297 with 95% CI = [.250, .337]  
                                                        
